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Where is cognitive science heading? 
 
 
William Ramsey (2007) claims that the move from classical to nonclassical cognitive 
science  involves  a  shift,  indeed  a  U-turn,  in  the  status  of  cognitive  science  itself  – 
namely, cognitive science is “moving away from representationalism” (235). This claim 
presupposes both that (i) the emergence of cognitivism, as a reaction to behaviourism, 
capitalized  on  the  concept  of  representation,  and  that  (ii)  the  materialization  of 
nonclassical cognitive science since the 1990s involves a return to some form of pre-
cognitivist  behaviourism.  As  Ramsey  puts  it,  after  the  cognitive  revolution,  a 
“revolution in reverse” (223) is now taking place. In this paper, we wish to contest 
Ramsey’s analysis of where cognitive science is heading, and for that reason we will 
present a two-sided argument, to the effect that both (i) and (ii) may be called into 
question. But, first of all, let us take a closer look at Ramsey’s argument in support of 
his views about current cognitive science.  
 
Representation in cognitive explanation, according to Ramsey 
Ramsey’s thesis about the status of current cognitive science is a result of his views 
about  the  role  of  representations  in  cognitive  explanations.  In  particular,  Ramsey 
believes that there are different concepts of representation in contemporary cognitive 
explanations;  and  furthermore,  that  unlike  the  explanations  offered  by  classical 
(computational) models of cognition, those offered by newer nonclassical models, such 
as connectionism and dynamicism, are not representational explanations at all (2007, 
xiii-xv).
1 Thus, his thesis about the status of cognitive science relies crucially on the 
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(alleged)  divide between  the  genuinely  representational  nature  of  classical  cognitive 
explanations, and the nonrepresentational nature of nonclassical explanations. So, what 
are Ramsey’s reasons for this divide?  
Ramsey’s  reasons  are  directly  related  to  the  following  claim:  only  classical 
cognitive explanations meet the job description challenge. This is, in Ramsey’s own 
words,  the  challenge  to  provide  “some  sort  of  account  of  just  how  the  structure’s 
possession  of  intentional  content  is  (in  some  way)  relevant  to  what  it  does  in  the 
cognitive system. [...] We need, in other words, an account of how it actually serves as a 
representation in a physical system; of how it functions as a representation” (27).  As a 
gloss, consider the familiar idea that cognitive science is founded on a hierarchy of three 
levels of analysis (computational, algorithmic and implementational), to the effect that 
the explanation of abilities characterized at the computational level must lie in states 
and  processes  found  in  the  lower  levels.  Thus,  in  the  context  of  providing  a 
representational  explanation  for  a  given  ability  (at  the  computational  level),  the job 
description  challenge  is  the  challenge  to  show  what  it  is  for  a  system  to  employ 
representational  explanatory  structures  at  a  lower  level;  more  specifically,  at  the 
algorithmic level. Therefore, as stated, it is Ramsey’s claim that only classical cognitive 
explanations meet the job description challenge, which in turn is due to the different 
notions of representation present in classical versus nonclassical accounts of cognition. 
So, what are these different concepts of representation? 
As it is widely known, the main idea behind classical models of cognition is that 
cognitive tasks and abilities are explained in terms of symbol manipulation according to 
syntactic  rules.  But  beyond  this  main  idea,  Ramsey  distinguishes  two  notions  of 
representation in classical models, in virtue of two different features of the explanations 
they  offer.  The  first  feature  is  that  classical  cognitive  explanations  are  task-Where is cognitive science heading? 
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decompositional, involving the division of a given cognitive task into further subtasks. 
There is here a notion of representation, for the inputs/outputs of the subtasks must 
represent aspects of the larger task, for them to count as subtasks of the larger task. 
Therefore,  if  cognitive  explanations  are  task-decompositional,  they  must  be 
representational. As the key lies with the inputs/outputs interior to the subtasks, Ramsey 
calls the  representational posits involved interior input/output representations; or for 
short, IO-representations (72f). The second feature of classical explanations is that they 
involve models or simulations of the cognitive task or ability to be explained. The idea 
of  a  model  is  that  of  a  structural  isomorphism  between  the  target  domain  and  the 
explanation, which in turn leads to the idea that the constituents of the model stand in 
for aspects of the target domain. Therefore, if cognitive explanations involve models or 
simulations, they must be representational. Ramsey labels the notion of representation 
involved S-representation (78ff). 
By  contrast,  nonclassical  approaches  to  cognition,  including  connectionist  and 
dynamicist  models,  reject  the  main  idea  behind  classical  models  –  namely,  that 
cognitive explanations are a matter of symbol manipulation according to syntactic rules. 
However,  nonclassical  approaches,  particularly  connectionist  explanations,  are  often 
thought  to  involve  representations,  despite  the  fact  that  they  involve  neither  task-
decomposition  nor  simulations.  So,  what  notion  of  representation  is  at  work  here? 
According to Ramsey, there are in fact two such notions. First, it is argued that the 
internal “hidden” units in connectionist networks represent, in virtue of the fact that 
they respond to, detect, or are receptive to, different aspects of the environment. This 
involves a particular notion of representation, called the receptor notion, characterized 
in terms of a “causal or nomic dependency relation” to some external condition (123). 
Second, it is said that, in accordance with the distributed processing of connectionist Where is cognitive science heading? 
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networks, the representational status of such networks cannot be a matter of one-to-one 
correspondences between items. Instead, it is thought that representations are tacitly 
distributed  over  the  entire  system,  in  so  far  as  the  system  as  a  whole  embodies  a 
practical know-how pertaining to the cognitive task at hand; in other words, the system 
has the “potential to generate the right sort of processes and input-output mappings” 
(156).  The  result  is  that  a  different  notion  of  representation,  the  tacit  notion,  is 
associated with connectionist explanations. 
On the basis of this taxonomy of notions of representation, Ramsey claims that 
only  classical  explanations  involve  representations  because,  in  his  own  words,  “the 
explanatory utility of a representational posit ... depends on the way it actually allows us 
to understand how cognition involves the employment of an internal state that serves to 
stand for (or stand in for) something else” (221). In other words, given that explanations 
in terms of IO- and S-representations involve structures or processes standing (in) for 
something else, it follows that those explanations are genuinely representational. But for 
Ramsey, things are very different with nonclassical accounts of cognition, as it has not 
been shown that explanations in terms of the receptor and tacit notions are genuinely 
representational. Thus, as Ramsey notes regarding the receptor notion of representation, 
the fact that certain states “have the function of causing something to happen in certain 
conditions ... alone gives us no reason to treat them as representations”; and should be 
treated instead as “reliable causal mediators or perhaps relay switches” (126). Similarly 
with the tacit notion:  as “it is far  from  clear just how the dispositional nature of  a 
system’s internal structures bestows upon them a representational function” (167), tacit 
representational states should be viewed as “nothing other than straightforward, non-
representational  dispositional  states”  (152).  Hence,  Ramsey’s  divide  between  the Where is cognitive science heading? 
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genuinely  representational  nature  of  classical  cognitive  explanations  versus  the 
nonrepresentational nature of nonclassical explanations. 
This article will take issue with Ramsey’s claim that there is such a neat divide 
between classical and nonclassical cognitive explanations. To this end, two different 
strategies will be offered. On the one hand, by pursuing a beefing-up strategy, it will be 
argued that nonclassical (both connectionist and dynamicist) explanations can be treated 
as representational explanations, in exactly the same sense as classical explanations; in 
particular,  they  can  be  seen  as  exploiting  the  notion  of  structural  isomorphism 
associated  with  S-representations.  On  the  other  hand,  by  pursuing  this  time  a 
deflationary strategy, it will be claimed that explanations in terms of S-representations 
fail the job description challenge for the same reason that nonclassical accounts, like 
those involving the receptor notion of representation, do. 
It is important to emphasize that the gist of our critical argument is only that if 
either strategy is successful, no difference between classical and nonclassical models of 
cognition  ensues.  In  particular,  we  are  not  committed  to  defending  one  notion  of 
representation,  for  instance  S-representations,  as  the  relevant  notion  for  cognitive 
science;  and  neither  do  we  take  sides  in  the  controversy  whether  classical  or 
nonclassical models provide the correct architecture of the brain. Following Ramsey’s 
lead, all that interest us here is the notion of representation and its place in the different 
kinds of cognitive explanations currently on offer. Bearing this in mind, let us consider 
the aforementioned strategies in turn. 
 
The beefing-up strategy  
As we’ve seen, Ramsey cashes out the model-based approach in terms of an alleged 
structural isomorphism between features of the model and the target domain; a form of Where is cognitive science heading? 
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isomorphism  that  grants  the  representational  import  of  the  model.  Unfortunately, 
connectionist networks appear to operate in a manner that does not grant it. As Ramsey 
points out, although hidden unit activations co-vary with the input vectors the network 
is  fed  with,  such  correlations  are  not  structure-preserving.  Courtesy  of  the  learning 
algorithm for connection weight adjustment, neural networks tune to their environments 
inasmuch as hidden units acquire values of activation that causally mediate between 
incoming patterns of activation and output responses. We may therefore say that hidden 
vectors depend nomically upon the input vectors. Put bluntly, if connectionist networks 
are function approximators, hidden units serve the purpose of relay switches for the 
cognitive function to be approximated. 
First of all, we wish to call into question this appraisal of connectionist theory. It 
is certainly true that you can read the dynamics of a neural network in receptor terms. 
However, it is not clear that the internal states that develop as a result of training fail to 
be  structure-preserving.  Learning  algorithms,  such  as  backpropagation,  allow  the 
system to adjust its connection weights in order to tune to the statistical regularities 
contained in the data pool. As a result of training, hidden space gets partitioned in order 
to reflect in a systematic manner the structure of the corpus. Thus, if the network is 
trained  to  distinguish  mines  from  rocks  (121),  it  will  develop  the  representational 
resources to separate metrically hidden patterns of activation that stand for particular 
mines from those that stand for particular rocks. Of course, this is not new. It’s the old 
story of how a connectionist network can approximate a non-linearly separable function 
by recoding the similarity relations that obtain in the input space in terms of a different 
set of relations that obtain at the hidden layer (as the well-known XOR problem has 
taught us). Statistical techniques such as cluster analysis allow us then to grasp what the 
network is doing. If the network successfully tells mines apart from rocks it is because Where is cognitive science heading? 
 
8 
the hidden n-dimensional hyperspace has been partitioned by an (n-1)-hyperplane into 
two different subregions. These volumes are occupied by more and less prototypical 
mine and rock hidden vectors, and their metric relations statistically reflect the relations 
that  obtain  between  real  mines  and  rocks  out  there.  Therefore,  the  conclusion  that 
connectionist hidden states are subject to an S-representational reading seems to follow.     
Nevertheless, in order to better appraise how the beefing-up strategy is meant to 
deliver  the  goods,  we  may  pay  closer  attention  to  the  way  in  which,  according  to 
Ramsey, S-representations are meant to work. Ramsey asks the reader (81) to imagine 
someone  who  is  asked  to  infer  genealogical  relationships  out  of  a  large  set  of 
individuals that belong to the same family. A solution is to write down the names of the 
family  members  as  labels,  and  connect  these  with  arrows  that  designate  specific 
relations such as “married to”, “son/daughter of”, etc. Once the diagram is completed, 
this diagram can be exploited in order to make inferences that relate to already known 
links or to familial relations that the subject may not even be aware of (if Bob is the F of 
Jim,  who  is  the  G  of  Mary,  then  Bob  is  the  H  of  Mary).  Put  bluntly,  inferential 
coherence  is  granted  because  the  network  of  labels  and  arrows  models  the  actual 
genealogical tree.  
Interestingly enough, during the re-emergence of connectionism in the mid 80s, 
the genealogical example was analyzed as an illustration of the manifest generalization 
capacities  of  connectionist  networks.  Hinton  (1986)  considered  a  genealogical  tree 
problem and showed how a network that models in hidden space, as a result of training, 
the  familial  tree  structure,  could  infer  unknown  familial  relations.  According  to 
Ramsey,  the  classicist  familial  diagram  clearly  meets  the  job  description  challenge 
because it “generates a symbolic model of the target domain” (82). Instead of symbols, 
Hinton’s  networks  employ  subsymbols,  which  may  equally  be  thought  of  as  S-Where is cognitive science heading? 
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representations “by serving as parts of the model” (83). Certainly, subsymbols are finer-
grained entities than symbols, and may be more difficult to keep track of, but that is 
precisely  the  job  that  cluster  analysis  and  other  statistical  dimension-reducing 
techniques are meant to do. In this way, inferential coherence can be equally granted in 
the case of connectionist theory, not because the network induces the labels and arrows 
of the classicist diagram, but rather because hidden partitions, as identified statistically, 
model subsymbolically the genealogical tree. 
Ramsey  may  nonetheless  disagree  with  our  understanding  of  connectionist 
modelling. In fact, he considers cluster analysis: “To draw the conclusion that a vector 
analysis  reveals  a  networks’s  representational  scheme,  you  have  to  first  assume  the 
hidden units are, in fact, serving as representations. The mere clustering in the response 
profile doesn’t show this” (145). However, we believe that this reading of the situation 
misses the target by focusing upon the networks’ hidden unit activations; a reading that 
tips the balance in favour of the receptor interpretation: “some sort of internal state 
reliably  responds  to,  is  caused  by,  or  in  some  way  nomically  depends  upon  some 
external  condition.  When  this  occurs,  such  a  state,  whether  it  be  called  a 
“representation” or a “detector” … is viewed as having the role of representing that 
external condition because of this causal or nomic dependency relation” (123). In our 
view, this nomic-based reading of the sort of explanation that connectionism offers is 
the result of focusing too narrowly upon connectionist components, that is, the hidden 
units themselves (e.g., hidden pattern-Bob/Jim/Mary), rather than upon architectural 
features  that  have  to  do  with  the  patterns  of  connectivity  that  obtain  among  the 
processing units. Let us elaborate. 
Considering  the  above  quotes,  the  question  is  whether  we  need  to  assume 
beforehand that hidden units play a representational role. Well, not necessarily. That Where is cognitive science heading? 
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would be tantamount to claiming, in the case of the classical  framework, that what 
counts for the purpose of meeting the job description challenge is that there is a one-to-
one representational relationship to be found between individual internal posits and their 
respective referents in the environment, taken in isolation from the role the former play 
within  the  model.  But,  as  the  family  tree  problem  exemplifies,  the  virtue  of  S-
representations  was precisely  that  what  counted  was  rather  how  the  set  of  relations 
among constituents in the model matches the set of relations among constituents in the 
target domain, and not the one-to-one correspondences among components belonging to 
the two different sets, taken in isolation. Similarly, in connectionist networks, it is the 
structural isomorphism itself between real world relations among family members, on 
the one hand, and hidden relations among hidden patterns of activation, on the other, 
what made the model S-representational. 
By  the  same  token,  in  the  case  of  connectionism,  it  is  not  the  clustering, 
understood as the statistical localization of hidden patterns of activation (components), 
what counts, but rather the recoding itself, courtesy of the architecture of the network. 
Putting it in slightly different terms, it is the capacity to abstract away from physical 
details of the input signal what allows the network to build up an abstract space where 
distances between vectors reflect environmental dependencies.  In fact, an increasing 
level of abstractness can be obtained by inserting hierarchies of hidden layers. Ryder 
(2004), for example, exploits these architectural constraints in order to put forward a 
cortical  network  model  of  mental  representation  known  as  SINBAD  (“Set  of 
INteracting BAckpropagating Dendrites”). SINBAD is organized hierarchically in such 
a way that higher levels of abstractness can be computed as the layers distance their 
recodings from the metric relations of the sensory input space. The result is that hidden 
partitions end up tuning the statistically relevant dependencies contained in the data Where is cognitive science heading? 
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pool.  Crucially,  as  Ryder  pinpoints,  SINBAD  cortical  networks  are  structurally 
isomorphic to the environment they are trained in.
2 
Certainly, as Ramsey points out, the real issue boils down to what sort of theories 
get  developed  in  cognitive  neuroscience,  connectionist  cognitive  modelling,  and 
cognitive ethology (118), among other disciplines. And in this regard, the notion of a 
detector (the computational counterpart of the biological neuron) plays a central role in 
cognitive  neuroscience.  It  further  goes  without  saying  that  biological  detectors  and 
philosophical  receptors  fit  hand  in  glove.  But  the  reason  why  Ramsey  reads 
connectionist  pattern  of  activation  in  terms  of  receptors  may  be  simpler.  When  he 
considers connectionism he has in mind three-layer feedforward neural networks of the 
sort that can categorize mines and rocks, or solve family tree problems. In this sort of 
networks cognitive activity is accounted for in terms of the vectorial transformation of 
input patterns of activation into output ones via hidden vectors. The receptor picture it 
offers in terms of one-to-one vectorial correspondences cries out. But as we already 
mentioned,  this  result  is  achieved  at  the  expense  of  focusing  upon  components 
(neurons) instead of architectural constraints.  
                                                 
2 Incidentally, Ramsey himself acknowledges that Ryder’s notion of cortical representation is model-
based (80). He also  mentions Grush’s (2004) emulation theory of  mental representation as a second 
nomic deserter. However, as Ramsey mulls over the implications of a non-representational psychology, 
he observes that these model-based nonclassical theories are the exception rather than the rule (223). 
Another model that would serve equally to illustrate the beefing up strategy is O’Brien and Opie’s (2004) 
structuralist  theory  of  mental  representation.  Their  model  is  cashed  out  in  terms  of  second-order 
resemblances;  a  category  that  insofar  as  it  comprehends  all  forms  of  structural  isomorphism  would 
receive Ramsey’s beneplacit. Fortunately, the degree of popularity of a theory sheds little light on the 
alleged  representational  status  of  the  explanations  it  offers,  so  we  need  not  consider  further  how 
exceptional model-based connectionist theories happen to be. Where is cognitive science heading? 
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In  this  respect,  in  line  with  modelling  results  in  computational  and  cognitive 
neuroscience (Rolls and Treves, 1998), we may consider nonclassical architectures that 
depart  in  critical  respects  from  the  sort  of  straw-man  connectionism  that  Ramsey 
appears to have in mind. By non-classical forms of connectionism, we mean the class of 
models  that  have  different  combinations  of  pattern  associator/autoassociative 
memory/competitive network topologies, with bidirectional connectivity and inhibitory 
competition,  and  that  employ  combined  Hebbian  and  activation-phase  learning 
algorithms.
3  The  idea  is  that  by  employing  bidirectional  and  recurrent  forms  of 
connectivity these architectures differ from the feedforward picture in such a way that 
relational information can be encoded. Going back to Ryder’s SINBAD model for the 
sake of illustration, we can see why these architectural features matter. As Ryder puts it: 
“The reason that a cortical SINBAD network develops into a dynamic isomorphism is 
that cells’ inputs are not only sensory, but are also (in fact primarily) derived from 
within the cortical network. A cell’s tuning is guided, in part, by these intracortical 
connections”  (2004,  p.  221).  In  this  way,  nonfeedforward  connectivity  allows  the 
network’s internal space to reflect the relational information among hidden patterns as 
activations  are  transformed  and  connection  weights  altered  by  taking  into  account 
internal connectivity. In our view, once the emphasis is laid upon layered connectivity, 
both across layers and within layers, we can see that the frameworks that cognitive 
neuroscience  and  related  disciplines  put  forward  crucially  exploit  model-based 
resources.  Although  the  nomic-based  resources  present  in  detectors  and  three-layer 
feedforward  networks  are  not  dismissed  out  of  hand,  the  moral  to  be  drawn  from 
Hinton’s  and  Ryder’s  nets  is  that  the  representational  status  of  such  connectionist 
                                                 
3 See Calvo Garzón (2003a), and the references therein. Where is cognitive science heading? 
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networks lies in the isomorphic relations between the components of the modelling nets 
and the constituents of the target domain. 
Finally,  what  about  dynamicist  theories  of  cognition?  Well,  if  connectionist 
hidden states can get beefed-up into full-blown representational states for the system, 
the same goes for the internal states of dynamical models. The reason is simply that if 
connectionism can be understood in S-representational terms because of the emphasis 
laid upon architectural constraints, we have stronger reasons to believe that the same 
holds  for  dynamicism  insofar  as  it  departs  from  the  static  structure  of  three  layer 
feedforward networks more radically than nonclassical connectionist networks. In this 
way,  and  for  the  same  reasons  offered  above,  dynamicist  internal  states  are  also 
statistically isomorphic to the environment in a way that does not boil down to one-to-
one correspondences.
4  
Summing  up,  connectionist  and  dynamicist  models  of  cognition  have  the 
resources  to  exploit  the  notion  of  structural  isomorphism  associated  with  S-
representations. In so far as this is a feature common to both classical and nonclassical 
explanations  of  cognition,  Ramsey’s  claim  that  only  classical  explanations  are 
genuinely  representational  must be  resisted.  But  this  is  not  the  only  way  to  oppose 
                                                 
4 It must be said that the borderline between connectionist and dynamicist models of cognition cannot be 
drawn easily (Spencer and Thelen, 2003). Ryder’s SINBAD model is a dynamic system after all. As 
Ryder (2006) notes elsewhere: “The type of models the cortex is designed to build are dynamic models. 
The elements of a static model and the isomorphic structure it represents are constants... By contrast, in a 
dynamic model the elements in the isomorphic structures are variables. Rather than mirroring spatial 
structure, a dynamic model mirrors covariational structure” (pp. 125-6). However the divide is drawn 
between connectionist and dynamicist networks, it’s clear that the beefing-up strategy works in the latter 
case, if it does in the former class of models. Where is cognitive science heading? 
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Ramsey’s  characterization  of  the  different  nature  of  clasical  versus  nonclassical 
explanations, as will be seen next. 
 
The deflationary strategy 
As noted above, Ramsey’s test to determine whether a given cognitive explanation is 
genuinely  representational  is  the  job  description  challenge.  To  repeat,  this  is  the 
challenge to show what function a system’s structures and states have for the system. 
More precisely, what this means is that it must be shown that a given structure plays a 
representational  role,  without  invoking  or  presupposing  a  cognitive  agent.  This  is 
related to the fact that the explanations proper to cognitive science must be agent-free 
explanations,  if  the  different  levels  of  analysis  (computational,  algorithmic  and 
implementational) are not to be conflated. The underlying idea here could be related to 
the personal/subpersonal distinction, as follows: if the aim of cognitive science is to 
provide an explanation of a given computational task or ability at the lower levels, and 
the former are typical personal-level tasks or abilities, then the explanatory  aims of 
cognitive science must involve positing states or structures at a different (subpersonal) 
level. Consider, in this light, Ramsey’s notion of a mindless system. 
When introducing the family tree problem as an illustration of S-representations in 
the  classical  framework,  Ramsey  considers  the  complaint  that  we  may  be  after  all 
presupposing  some  sort  of  agency  that  allows  the  system  to  infer  cognitively  the 
genealogical relations. Thus, someone may argue that discovering the fact that Bob is 
the H of Mary is the result of the personal level processing of the fact that Bob is the F 
of Jim and the fact that Jim is the G of Mary. However, Ramsey is careful enough to 
differentiate  the  personal  inference-making  abilities  from  the  subpersonal  syntactic 
crunching of the family tree relations.  It is by  focusing upon the latter that the job Where is cognitive science heading? 
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description challenge is allegedly met. In fact, the structural isomorphism between the 
labels and arrows in the diagram, on the one hand, and the relations that obtain among 
family members, on the other, would allow a mindless system to remain competent in 
the task (85). Mindlessness thus illustrates how to avoid the conflation between personal 
and  subpersonal  levels.  As  Ramsey  points  out,  “the  property  of  being  nomically 
dependent  upon  some  other  condition  and  the  property  of  sharing  a  structural 
isomorphism with other things are both properties that are sufficiently natural to suggest 
the possibility of constructing an account of representation that is properly mindless”. 
However, he continues, “… the mindless strategy does not work equally well for both 
of these representational notions” (193). From here, the claim that “the conditions that 
underlie S-representation successfully answer the job description challenge ... while the 
conditions that typically underlie receptor notion do not” (189) is a simple step away. 
But  is  it  truly  the  case  that  the  mindless  strategy  works  better  in  the  case  of  S-
representations? 
Ramsey  offers  a  further  example  to  illustrate  and  defend  the  claim  that  only 
mindless systems using S-representations, as opposed to those using the receptor notion, 
meet the job description challenge. Consider car A (194), which successfully moves 
through a curved segment of a walled track, because it has two rods sticking out from 
the corners of the front bumper, so that if a rod is pushed inwards as the car approaches 
one of the walls, a servomechanism is activated, turning the car away from the wall and 
through the curve. According to Ramsey, car A is a receptor system, for the states of the 
car  that  explain  its  navigational  success  causally  co-vary  with  external  conditions. 
However,  there  is  nothing  representational  about  the  system:  all  that  is  required  to 
explain  the  car’s  success  are  a  set  of  internal  structures  and  states  acting  as  causal 
mechanisms or relay switches. Where is cognitive science heading? 
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Compare now the receptor car with car B, which successfully negotiates the same 
curved segment of the track, because it has a rudder that fits into a groove along the 
track, to the effect that because the groove is shaped as the track itself, changes in the 
rudder as the car moves along the groove bring about changes in the car’s steering 
wheel  and  front  wheels.  According  to  Ramsey,  car  B  is  a  modelling  or  S-
representational system, because the car’s internal states exploit the fact that “an area of 
the groove functions as a ‘stand-in’ for a segment of the track [which] is just to say that 
an area of the groove is playing a representational role” (199). 
For Ramsey, the point of the contrast between both cars is that viewing a system 
as representational (and the explanation of some of the system’s successful behaviour as 
involving representational internal states) is independent of the presence of cognitive 
agents  (recall  that both  cars  are  mindless  or  agent-free  systems).  In  fact,  all  that  is 
required, as in the aforementioned family tree example, is that a structure or state of the 
system stand in for the real world; for “[a] mindless system can still take advantage of 
the structural isomorphism between internal structures and the world, and in so doing, 
employ elements of those internal structures as representations-qua-stand-ins” (200). 
The point is not that components of the system can be viewed or described as standing 
in for elements of the real world; after all, they can also be described as parts of an 
internal  causal  mechanism.  Rather,  the  point  is  that  it  is  more  natural,  intuitive, 
beneficial (196), and less contrived (199), to view the components of the system as 
standing in for elements in the real world; hence, as performing a representational role. 
Let us consider this a little further. 
Ramsey’s  reason  for  claiming  that  it  is  more  natural  to  view  car  B  as  a 
representational system is that the groove where the rudder fits is a model, a sort of 
map, of the track itself (200). Of course, any map can be used by a minded being to Where is cognitive science heading? 
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guide its behaviour. But given that Ramsey is interested in mindless systems, the crucial 
underlying  thought  must  be  that  maps  are  inherently  representational;  i.e.,  they  are 
representational independently of the presence of a cognitive agent. More precisely, the 
underlying thought must be that the very existence of a map, as used by a mindless 
system, is sufficient to explain a given cognitive success in representational terms. So, if 
as claimed car B employs a sort of map, then car B is a mindless but representational 
system.  
The underlying thought here seems to be that maps, as used by a mindless system, 
are representational, independently of cognitive agents. This idea can be glossed by 
saying that maps fit, or not, directly, simply, or naturally; or perhaps, that there is a 
natural isomorphism between the map, as used by the mindless system, and the target 
domain. Hence, explanation of cognitive success is a matter of processes that happen 
naturally, independently of cognitive agents. But the problem with this gloss is that this 
notion of a natural fit or isomorphism cannot do all the work it is expected to do, and 
this for two interrelated reasons. 
On the one hand, one could separate the notion of fit from the explanation of 
cognitive success. In this respect, consider how a map could be broken up into squares 
and put back together with the squares arranged in a different (one may say, wrong) 
order. This would be a sort of coded map; that is, a map which would only serve as a 
representational device for those in possession of the code, i.e. for those who know 
(perhaps because they have memorized it) the way in which the different squares should 
relate to each other.  A coded map like this one would be an example of a map that does 
not fit (in the intended direct, simple or natural way). In other words, it would not be the 
case that the map is (again, in the intended sense) inherently representational; that is, 
representational  independently  of  any  cognitive  agent.  But  the  map  could  explain  a Where is cognitive science heading? 
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system’s cognitive success: consider, for instance, how a secret agent  might benefit 
from  the  use  of  such  a  map.  Thus,  the  notion  of  fit  can  be  separated  from  the 
explanation of cognitive success. The important point here is not that a contrast must be 
drawn between coded and uncoded maps – namely, that unlike uncoded maps, coded 
maps need supplementing with the relevant code in order to perform a representational 
role. The important point is that coded and uncoded maps alike require the idea of a 
cognitive  user,  as  opposed  to  that  of  (direct,  simple  or  natural)  fit,  to  explain  any 
cognitive (e.g., navigational) success. 
On the other hand, the idea of a cognitive user must be different from, and external 
to, that of the mindless system itself, or a part of it. In this regard, consider how the 
advocate of the idea that there are natural representational processes, independently of 
cognitive agents, might try to accommodate the example of the previous paragraph, 
arguing that mindless systems that successfully use maps to navigate through the world 
must have an extra component (a part of the system) playing the role of the code. It 
could even be suggested that this is what we normally take a map to be. In other words, 
that it is normal maps (those including the code) that fit by themselves, or are inherently 
representational. But this will not do. For the notion of a normal map, or that of a 
normal fit between a map and the world, is very closely related to what people do as a 
result of learning to use a map to navigate through the world. Therefore, there could not 
be such representational devices as maps in the absence of an established practice of 
map reading into which people are initiated. 
The point of this criticism is not that isomorphisms are cheap, something Ramsey 
can deal with by arguing that there is only one isomorphism actually employed by the 
mindless system in question (in our current example, car B). This reply still makes room 
for the idea that there is a natural fit between the structure in question, as used by the Where is cognitive science heading? 
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mindless  system,  and  the  target  domain,  which  is  sufficient  to  explain  a  cognitive 
success without invoking a cognitive agent. Rather, the gist of this criticism is that talk 
of a natural fit, or isomorphism, independently of cognitive agents themselves, is an 
illusion. This is not to say that there are no such things as (natural) isomorphisms; it is 
only to say that (natural) isomorphisms are not intelligible in the absence of cognitive 
agents. 
This criticism is in fact an adaptation of Wittgenstein’s rejection of the idea of an 
intrinsic fit between a mental picture and its application, in the absence of a communal 
practice of users of the picture (see PI §§139ss). Wittgenstein’s primary target is his 
own  picture  theory  of  mental  representation  as  advocated  in  the  Tractatus,  but  his 
argument can be applied mutatis mutandis to Ramsey’s conception of S-representation. 
To sum up, if this Wittgenstein-inspired criticism works, it will have been shown that S-
representations do not meet the job description challenge, for the notion of a cognitive 
agent must be invoked to characterize the idea of a structural isomorphism associated 
with  S-representations.  Assuming  as  Ramsey  does  both  that  only  those  cognitive 
explanations  that  employ  a  notion  of  representation  that  meets  the  job  description 
challenge  are  genuinely  representational,  and  that  classical  models  of  cognition  are 
based  on  the  notion  of  S-representation,  it  follows  that  classical  explanations  of 
cognition  are  not  genuinely  representational.  Therefore,  Ramsey’s  claim  that  only 
classical explanations of cognition are genuinely representational can be resisted; and 
hence,  his  characterization  of  the  different  status  of  classical  versus  nonclassical 
explanations of cognition. 
So far, it has been argued that if either the beefing-up or the deflationary strategies 
work,  Ramsey’s  characterization  of  the  divide  between  classical  and  nonclassical 
models  of  cognition  as  a  divide  between  genuinely  representational  versus Where is cognitive science heading? 
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nonrepresentational explanations can be resisted. In the last two sections, this critique 
has been pressed in connection with the notions of S-representation and the receptor 
notion, as present in classical and nonclassical models respectively. And although the 
contrast between these two notions looms large in Ramsey’s dialectic, these are only 
two of the notions of representation he admits to be currently on offer in cognitive 
science. According to Ramsey, classical models also employ IO-representations; and 
nonclassical  models,  the  tacit  notion  of  representation.  So,  can  these  two  different 
notions  of  representation  carry  the  weight  of  Ramsey’s  claim  that  only  classical 
cognitive  explanations  are  genuinely  representational?  To  anticipate  a  little,  in  the 
following section it will be argued both that, as was the case with the receptor notion,  
explanations in terms of the tacit notion of representation can be beefed-up; and that, 
like S-representations, explanations in terms of IO-representations can be deflated. As a 
result,  assuming  Ramsey’s  full  taxonomy  of  notions  of  representation  in  current 
cognitive science, his characterization of the divide between classical and nonclassical 
cognitive explanations will be resisted. 
 
Tacit and IO-representations 
Let us consider the tacit notion first. Nonclassical approaches, to remind the reader, may 
help  themselves  to  tacit  representations  that  are  distributed  over  the  entire  system. 
Hinton’s  (1986)  family  tree  network,  for  example,  succeeds  because  it  employs 
distributed patterns of activation superposed on the same weight matrix. Being fed with 
the patterns Bob and H of, the network will output Mary. This, let’s assume, correct 
response  will  be  triggered  even  when  the  network  has  not  been  trained  on  that 
relationship, as long as it has been trained on others (Bob is the F of Jim, who is the G of 
Mary)  that  allow  the  network  to  infer  the  H-of  link.  In  this  way,  the  network’s Where is cognitive science heading? 
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generalization capabilities are  explained by appealing to the  encoding in the weight 
matrix of a practical know-how that pertains in our example to the cognitive task of 
uncovering genealogical relations in the family tree. Hinton’s network is thus disposed 
to output correct responses tacitly.  
Unfortunately,  Ramsey  questions  the  notion  of  superpositionality  as  what 
underlies our understanding of tacit representations. Once it is called into question, we 
are left with (mere) superposed dispositions, which are representationless. As we saw 
earlier, tacit representations reduce to nonrepresentational dispositional states of the sort 
that can be found in many reactive systems. Ramsey spells out in detail the reasons why 
he thinks that the dispositional properties of a neural network are not representational. 
For the purposes of this section, however, we shall consider a more specific aspect of 
Ramsey’s  criticism  –  namely,  his  questioning  the  very  conceivability  of  superposed 
representations in connectionist theory. As he observes, it is “far from a given that the 
idea of superposed representations is even fully intelligible” (178). His concern is “how 
it is that truly distinct, specifiable items of content can be simultaneously represented by 
the exact same … computational conditions” (178). 
Ramsey is asking how different contentful states can be represented by means of 
the same computational conditions. But we don’t think it is obvious that the “exact same 
…  computational  conditions”  are  present  across  items  of  content.  In  our  view  that 
depends  on  how  the  vehicles  of  content  are  individuated  in  connectionist  networks. 
Ramsey considers the weight matrix as a whole as the vehicle of content, and that is 
why  he  targets  superpositionality.  But  we  must  drop  the  idea  that  the  only  kind  of 
description available to the connectionist modeller is the one at the level of the weights 
matrix, as superposition, under Ramsey’s lens, implies. How can we then individuate 
the vehicles of content in connectionist networks?  Where is cognitive science heading? 
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Although we may help ourselves to a number of candidates in the connectionist 
literature  as  the  vehicles  of  content,  for  present  purposes  we  shall  consider  what 
O’Brien and Opie (2006) call fan-ins.
5 A fan-in is the specific part of the overall weight 
matrix that transforms input patterns of activation for each single hidden layer unit. In 
O’Brien and Opie’s words, and considering the sort of simple feedforward architectures 
that Ramsey has in mind, a fan-in “is the vector of weights modulating the effect of 
incoming activity on a particular hidden unit. Within any feedforward network there is 
one fan-in per hidden unit, each corresponding to a row of the network’s hidden layer 
weight matrix” (2006, p. 38). But notice that it is only by taking the whole weight 
matrix as the vehicle of content that Ramsey’s worry that “truly distinct, specifiable 
items of content can be simultaneously represented by the exact same … computational 
conditions” makes sense. The same computational conditions are those that we identify 
under the modulation of activation patterns that the weight matrix produces throughout 
the whole network. However, by individuating the vehicles of content as fan-ins the 
worry  that  tells  against  a  superpositional  concept  of  representation  disappears.  The 
reason is that different fan-ins correspond to different computational conditions, as the 
weight matrix gets divided up into rows. 
Granting  thus  that  superposition  can  be  conceived  of,  why  are  fan-ins  to  be 
interpreted representationally? Fortunately, in order to answer this question, once we 
have a harmless form of superposition, we can rescue the beefing-up strategy already 
                                                 
5 Other options include the well known microfeatural descriptions of Churchland (1989), and the more 
recent  clustering  approach  of  Shea  (2007).  Churchland’s  microfeatural  rendering  of  the  vehicles  of 
content is fleshed out in terms of hidden patterns of activation, and therefore takes us back to the receptor 
notion  of  representation  (for  a  criticism  of  Churchland’s  connectionist  semantics,  see  Calvo  Garzón, 
2003b). On the other hand, although Shea’s clustering approach escapes the receptor notion, and may be a 
more promising candidate in that sense, it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze it in detail. Where is cognitive science heading? 
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deployed in the case of the receptor notion. As O’Brien and Opie point out, “if we are to 
discover any structural resemblance between a network’s connection weights and its 
task domain it is the fan-ins on which we should focus… Given the crucial role of fan-
ins in network processing, we offer the following proposal: the fan-ins in the hidden 
layer  of  a  successful  connectionist  network  structurally  resemble  aspects  of  the 
network’s  task  domain.”  (2006,  pp.  37-8).  The  reader  can  see  that  the  bearing  of 
O’Brien and Opie’s treatment of fan-ins is straightforward upon our current concerns. 
By typing fan-ins as the vehicles of content, we can apply to the case of superposition 
the structural isomorphic way of beefing-up the receptor notion of representation in 
connectionist  networks,  bypassing  thus  Ramsey’s  worries.  In  short,  fan-ins  don’t 
superpose  in  Ramsey’s  sense,  and  are  thus  not  subject  to  the  dispositions-based 
criticism. 
Finally,  what  about  IO-representations?  Ramsey  chooses  multiplication  to 
illustrate IO-representations. We may define multiplication as the “task of transforming 
numerals of one sort (those standing for multiplicands) into numerals of another sort 
(those  standing  for  products)”  (69).  In  this  way,  a  function  that,  computationally 
speaking, is characterized in terms of abstract entities such as numbers and products, 
gets algorithmically fleshed out in terms of numerals that the system can manipulate, 
and that stand for numbers and products. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  case  of  multiplication  can  be  cashed  out  in  S-
representational terms. As Ramsey points out, “many would claim that all numerical 
computations are simulations of various mathematical functions. If this is true, then the 
IO notion could be  reduced to  a special type  of S-representation for these types of 
computational  operations”  (104).  But  once  IO-representations  reduce  to  S-
representations, the  reader will have spotted an obvious opportunity  for the sceptic. Where is cognitive science heading? 
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Namely, to deflate IO-representations once again: If S-representations do deflate for the 
map-related reasons adduced in the previous section, and IO-representations, following 
Ramsey, reduce to S-representations, then IO-representations may get deflated, so to 
speak, for free. Nevertheless, as we shall see next, even if IO-representations do not 
reduce  to  S-representations,  there  are  reasons  to  believe  that  the  job  description 
challenge still fails to be met. 
What  is  it  precisely  about  numerals  that  allow  the  system  to  meet  the  job 
description  challenge?  Ramsey  notes  that  cognitive  explanations  are  task-
decompositional in such a way that inputs/outputs of the subtasks that obtain as a result 
of  decomposition  represent  aspects  of  the  larger  task.  In  our  example,  since 
multiplication decomposes into (a series of) additions, the summands represent aspects 
of  multiplication  insofar  as  they  are  input/outputs  of  the  addition  subtask  that  the 
specific multiplicands involved in the larger task determine. As Ramsey notes, “many 
of the tasks performed by the inner sub-systems should be seen as natural ‘parts’ of the 
main  computations  that  form  the  overall  explanandum  …  Our  ability  to  do 
multiplications … might be explained by appealing to a sub-process that repeatedly 
adds a number to itself” (72). So, the notion of task-decomposition associated with IO-
representations crucially involves that of a natural task/subtask relation. However, this 
notion is not without problems. 
Ramsey chooses a highly disembodied task to illustrate IO-representations, but 
there is an initial worry that more ecological tasks cannot be decomposed into such neat 
“natural  parts”,  as  apparently  exemplified  by  the  relation  between  addition  and 
multiplication. After all, what would be the “natural parts” of more embodied tasks, 
such as face recognition, that would form Ramsey’s “overall explanandum”? Assuming 
that face recognition can be decomposed into subtasks representing aspects of the larger Where is cognitive science heading? 
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task, the problem is that the subtasks involved in face recognition may vary widely 
across agents and even for the same agent on different episodes of face recognition. It is 
then  difficult  to  make  sense  of  the  equivalent  of  the  adders  in  highly  idiosyncratic 
embodied tasks. Specific subtasks will receive incoming inputs and will operate upon 
them.  Likewise,  specific  subtasks  will  deliver  outputs  that  may  be  used  by  other 
subtasks and that will result ultimately in the output performance of the overall face 
recognition  system.  However,  the  equivalent  of  the  addition/multiplication  “natural” 
relation that allows for the exploitation of those inputs and outputs internally is lost to 
sight. 
But the problem with the notion a natural task/subtask relation is not just that there 
is no clear sense in which the notion can be transferred from highly disembodied to 
more  ecological  tasks.  If  this  was  all  that  is  wrong,  the  very  idea  of  a  natural 
task/subtask relation would be left unscathed (albeit one that could not be easily applied 
to ecological cognitive abilities). And as a result, that very idea could be appealed to in 
support of the claim that mindless systems whose cognitive abilities are explained in 
task-decompositional  terms  are  indeed  representational  systems,  and  the  cognitive 
explanations involved genuinely representational. In other words, it could be claimed 
that  a  task-decompositional  explanation  involves  explaining  a personal  level  task  in 
terms of subtasks, where aspects of the latter stand for aspects of the former naturally, 
that is, independently of the presence of a cognitive agent. Thus, it could be concluded 
that  in  so  far  as  the  representational  status  of  the  explanation  does  not  invoke  or 
presuppose cognitive agents, the job description challenge is met. 
However,  as  with  the  notion  of  fit  explored  above,  the  notion  of  a  natural 
task/subtask relation cannot do all this work. Consider again Ramsey’s own example, 
where addition is a “natural part” (or subtask) of multiplication. There is no problem Where is cognitive science heading? 
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with the idea that multiplication involves a series of additions. The problem lies with the 
idea that the relation in question is “natural” – that is, that addition and multiplication 
are  so  related  independently  of  any  cognitive  agents.  For  in  so  far  as  addition  and 
multiplication are the mathematical operations they are because of what people do, the 
relation between them is not independent of any cognitive agents. Only abstracting from 
this,  could  one  say  that  addition  is  (in  the  intended  sense)  a  natural  subtask  of 
multiplication. But if one did so abstract, one would be assuming, rather than showing, 
that the job description challenge is met. So, like S-representational explanations, IO-
representational explanations can also be deflated. 
 
Where is cognitive science heading? 
The previous sections have presented a sustained two-sided argument against Ramsey’s 
thesis  that  only  classical  accounts  of  cognition,  as  opposed  to  nonclassical 
(connectionist  and  dynamicist)  accounts,  are  genuinely  representational:  on  the  one 
hand, connectionist and dynamicist accounts have the resources to exploit the crucial 
notion of a structural isomorphism, like classical accounts (the beefing-up strategy); on 
the other hand, IO- and S-representations refer to a cognitive agent, and therefore do not 
meet  the  job  description  challenge  (the  deflationary  strategy).  Both  sides  of  this 
argument work independently of each other; and success with either of them will mean 
trouble  for  Ramsey’s  neat  divide  between  classical  and  representational,  versus 
nonclassical and nonrepresentational, models of cognition. 
However, this two-sided argument appears easily to run into serious difficulties. 
First, if nonclassical explanations in terms of receptors or dispositional properties are 
beefed-up, then all sorts of systems, including thermostats (136), faucets (144) or rubber 
bands (178), to name a few examples considered by Ramsey, will have representational Where is cognitive science heading? 
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properties; hence panrepresentationalism follows. Second, if classical explanations are 
deflated,  and  no  (subpersonal)  algorithmic  system  turns  out  to  be  genuinely 
representational,  then  fictionalism  about  computational  processes  ensues,  either  in 
Dennett’s sense (i.e., we are just applying the intentional stance to real computational 
processes)  or  in  Searle’s  (i.e.,  we  are  just  treating  the  system’s  processes  as 
computational, though they really are not). But these are unwelcome consequences, in 
as  much  as  both  panrepresentationalism  and  fictionalism  are  “dubious”  (28)  and 
“counter-intuitive” (102). Therefore, the difference between classical and nonclassical 
models should be upheld.
6  
But  perhaps  things  are  not  as  bad  as  they  seem.  For  regarding  the  risk  of 
panrepresentationalism, what the beefing-up strategy entails is not that all sorts of things 
have  representational  properties;  but  rather  that  certain  types  of  connectionist  and 
dynamical  systems,  perhaps  amongst  them  the  human  brain,  have  the  resources  to 
exploit  the  notion  of  structural  isomorphism  associated  with  classical  models  of 
cognition. Therefore, the beefing-up strategy, if successful, is limited in scope, for it 
does  not  apply  automatically  to  all  systems  involving  receptors  or  dispositional 
properties. Hence, the risk of panrepresentationalism is diffused. 
Regarding  the  risk  of  fictionalism,  what  the  deflationary  strategy  means,  if 
successful, is that there are no inherently representational algorithmic processes (i.e., 
representational in the absence of a cognitive agent). In so far as cognitive science is 
conceived of as a reductive project, where personal level abilities are explained in terms 
of  what  happens  at  a  different  subpersonal  level,  it  follows  from  the  deflationary 
                                                 
6 A word of caution is needed here, regarding the dialectics of this paragraph, for Ramsey explicitly 
considers the dangers of panrepresentationalism to motivate his claim that nonclassical explanations in 
terms  of  receptors  and  dispositions  are  not  genuinely  representational.  However,  his  rejection  of 
fictionalism is not meant to directly support the claim that classical explanations in terms of IO- or S-
representations are genuinely representational, but only to respond to a possible objection (98ff). Thanks 
to Bill Ramsey for bringing this point to our attention.  Where is cognitive science heading? 
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strategy that there is no room for representations within cognitive science. This may 
look bleak, but it is important to note that the deflationary strategy does not mean the 
elimination of representational explanations altogether (as personal level explanations), 
but  only  the  elimination  of  representational  explanations  from  such  reductive 
undertakings as cognitive science. Now, if this is all that follows from the deflationary 
strategy, then fictionalism stops being a worrying issue. To begin with, the deflationary 
strategy must be distinguished from the thought, typically associated with Dennett’s 
fictionalism, that the intentional stance is nothing more than a useful device in order to 
explain  certain  cognitive  abilities;  for  the  deflationary  strategy  does  not  deny  that 
people,  as  opposed  to  subpersonal  systems,  have  representational  properties.  In 
addition, it must also be distinguished from Searle’s claim that computational processes 
are not real processes; for all the deflationary strategy entails is that processes at the 
algorithmic  level  are  not  inherently  representational,  not  that  there  are  no  such 
processes. In a nutshell, perhaps there are good reasons for moving towards fictionalism 
in either Dennett’s or Searle’s senses (perhaps not), but the deflationary strategy does 
not itself promote such a move. 
Summing up, then, the two-sided argument against Ramsey’s neat divide between 
classical and representational, versus nonclassical and nonrepresentational, accounts of 
cognitive explanations can be defended from the double risk of panrepresentationalism 
and fictionalism. What this means is that if connectionist and dynamicist explanations 
can  be  beefed-up,  then  cognitive  science  is  not  on  a  fast  road  to  a  “dubious” 
panrepresentationalism; and if task-decompositional, model-based explanations can be 
deflated,  then  cognitive  science  is  not  flirting  with  a  “counter-intuitive”  form  of 
fictionalism.  Where is cognitive science heading? 
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Where  then  is  cognitive  science  heading?  According  to  Ramsey,  insofar  as 
nonclassical models of cognition gain momentum, cognitive science research is “quietly 
and  unwittingly  moving  away  from  representationalism”  (235).  This 
nonrepresentational direction presupposes, first, that (i) the emergence of cognitivism in 
the 1950s, as a reaction to behaviourism, capitalizes on the concept of representation, 
and  second,  that  (ii)  the  materialization  of  nonclassical  cognitive  science  since  the 
1990s involves a return to some form of neo-behaviourism, insofar as the receptor and 
the tacit notions of representation fail to meet the job description challenge. In this way, 
after  the  cognitive  revolution,  we  seem  to  have  a  “revolution  in  reverse”  (223). 
However, this need not be the case since, if the line of argument put forward in this 
paper is correct, both (i) and (ii) may be called into question. On the one hand, contra 
(i), if the deflationary strategy works, cognitivism, as classically understood, would fail 
to  capitalize,  after  all,  on  the  concept  of  representation.  And  the  reason  is  that  IO-
representations and S-representations would fail to meet the job description challenge 
for the reasons offered earlier. On the other hand, contra (ii), in case the beefing-up 
strategy  is  sound,  the  return  to  a  pre-cognitivist  era  cancels  out,  since  nonclassical 
models  of  cognition  would  posit  representational  states  that  would  meet  the  job 
description challenge. In this way, either cognitive science is still representational, and 
therefore cognitivist, or a cognitive revolution, properly speaking, never took place. 
There is a further (third) possible scenario for cognitive science, if both strategies 
join forces to show that nonclassical and classical accounts face the job description 
challenge in equal conditions (by the beefing-up strategy), but equally fail to meet it (by 
the  deflationary  strategy).  In  this  scenario,  cognitive  science  does  not  offer 
representational  explanations  (in  the  relevant  sense),  as  the  advocate  of  beefed-up 
connectionism and dynamicism suggests. Hence, anti-representationalism in cognitive Where is cognitive science heading? 
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science  would  ensue.  But  for  the  main  objective  of  this  paper  –  that  is,  to  contest 
Ramsey’s claim that cognitive science is in the middle of a U-turn – it is sufficient to 
consider the consequences of either strategy on its own; hence, for current purposes, we 
remain neutral on the dispute between representationalists and anti-representationalists 
in cognitive science.  
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